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BAILMIENTS-WHEN Is A CARRIER A GRATUITOUS BAILEE-In the case of
Hofford v. N. Y. C. I. H. R. R. Co., 43 Pa. Super Ct., 303 (i9io). The
plaintiff sent her trunk to the outward baggage-room intending later to pur-
chase a ticket over the defendant's lines. She changed her mind and the next
morning demanded her trunk, which in the meantime had disappeared. The
defence was, first: that the Railroad was liable as a carrier under the New
York Statute limiting their liability on goods of undeclared value to $15o
or second that if a warehouseman, it was not liable, being a mere gratuitous
bailee. The Court denied both these points and affirmed judgment for the
plaintiff for the full amount demanded on the ground that the railroad was
a warehouseman in the ordinary sense of the word and therefore liable
as not having used ordinary and reasonable care.
All the Courts agree that in such a case the defendant company is not
liable as a carrier because the duty of immediate transportation has not arisen.
This applies to freight, London, etc. Ins. Co. v. Rome, etc. Ry., I44 N. Y.
2oo (1894) as well as personal baggage. Murray v. International S. S. Co.,
170 Mass. 166 (1898). It would seem that this is correct for if the company
cannot carry the baggage because ignorant of the contemplated destination or
because no destination has been decided upon by the owner, it would be
a gross injustice to hold them subject to the extraordinary liabilities of com-
mon-carriers while thus awaiting the determination of the owners.
The trend of authority in these cases is to regard the company as an
ordinary warehouseman or bailor for hire; Terry v. Southern Ry., 62 S. E.
249 (S. C. igo8), Ry. v. Zilly, 20 Ind. App. 569 (1897). Unless it appears
that for some reason there can be no charge for the period of storage,
when the liability becomes only that of a gratuitous bailee. Plow Co. v.
Wabash Ry. Co., 61 Mo. App. 372 (1895), M. S. I. N. Q. Ry. v. Schurtz, 7
Mich. 515 (1854). Where, however, it does not appear that anything was
charged for the storage, though for no apparent reason, there is some
divergence of opinion. Some cases hold that the carrier is liable as a ware-
houseman the necessary compensation, being either included in the original
charge or collectible at the carriers option. Bronson v. Atlantic Coast Line
Ry., 56 S. E. 538 (S. C. 1907). Others hold under practically similar facts
that the bailment is gratuitous, Van Gilder v. C. & N. Ry., -44 Iowa, 548
(1876), Clark v. Eastern Ry., 139 Mass. 423 (885). The theory of these
decisions seems to be that whether the carrier had a right to demand pay-
ment for storage, or not, he did not do so and therefore the bailment
must be taken to be gratuitous.
In the case under discussion the exact situation upon which the courts
have differed was presented. It appeared that it was customary for the
company to charge storage where the trunk was called for without being
checked. It did not, however, appear that the plaintiff had ever paid
anything or that the railroad ever asked her to pay. The court entirely disre-
garded this phase of the case and based its decision upon a new and distinct
ground, viz., that there is a mutual benefit in such a bailment. "We can-
not agree that the acceptance by a railroad of the baggage of an intending
passenger and depositing the same in a place provided by it for the purposes
(186)
RECENT CASES
of checking and safe keeping meantime, constitute a bailment for the sole
benefit of the intending passenger." In support of this agreement, Hoy v.
Clinton, 35 Pa. Super Ct., 297' (i9o8), a decision by the same court, is
cited. The case was similar except that the trunk was in storage with a
hotel. Under this theory it is of course impossible to regard the railroad as
a gratuitous bailee.
The court seems to have solved the difficulty in a satisfactory manner.
The storing of baggage prior to checking and subsequent to arrival is an
essential feature of every large system. Without it there would be hopeless
confusion and delay, innumerable losses in transitu and consequent litigation
by patrons. It is therefore greatly beneficial to a carrier to have such
facilities and use them. The benefit to the passenger is obvious. Having
held out these places where baggage may be safely stored it is only fair to
require of the company ordinary and reasonable care, instead of compelling
the passenger to bear the burden of all but the grossest negligence. Under
this decision the passenger's rights are fully protected and the carrier
made to bear no greater burden than should with justice, be imposed
upon it.
CONTRACTS-RESTRAINT OF TR.ADE IN LIMITING SALES-PRICE BY RETAILERS
-The manufacturers, under a secret process, of a proprietary medicine,
attempted to control the price of their product by making binding contracts
with all retail druggists with whom they dealt, whereby the retailers agreed
not to sell the medicine under a fixed price, and not to sell at all to wholesale
or retail dealers who were not accredited agents of the manufacturer. Held,
that the contracts were void as being in restraint of trade. W. H. Hill Co.
v. Gray and Worcester, 127 N. W. Rep. 803 (Mich. igio).
To the rule that contracts in general restraint of trade are void, there
are several notable exceptions: Articles made under patents may be the
subject of contracts b3 which their use and price in sub-sales may be con-
trolled by the patentee. Bement and Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186
U. S. 70, (i9go). This exception rests on the fact that the object of the
patent laws is monopoly, and it would be a glaring absurdity to grant a
monopoly by law, when the law prevented its enjoyment. Likewise the
statutory right to exclusively publish and end copies of a copyrighted
production would seem to take direct contracts between the publisher and
his vendees in respect to the price at which subsequent sales shall be made,
outside of the rule as to restrairits of trade. Murphy v. Christian Press
Asso. Co., 38 App. Div. 426 (N. Y. 1899). Covenants restraining the use
to be made of a trade secret do not contravene the common-law rule against
monopoly and restraint, because so long as the owner of a secret can pre-
serve its secrecy, there is necessarily a monopoly in its use; and there
can be no restraint of trade in respect of a formula which is known only
to those to whom the owner chooses to communicate it under restrictions.
Harrison v. Glucose Co., 116 Fed. 304 (19o2), 58 L. R. A. qi5; Fowle v.
Park, 131 U. S. 88 (1889). On the same basis rests the common-law
protection of an author, (Werckmeister v. Am. Lithographic Co., 134 Fed.
321 [1904], 68 L. R. A. 59T, and the cases relating to the distribution of
news and information. Exchange Tel. Co. v. Gregory, I Q. B. 147 (1896);
Bd. of Trade v. Grain and Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236 (i9o5).
Potent as are the reasons for making these exceptions to the general
rule, they have no application where protection-ks_ sought for the estab-
lishment of a monopoly in the sale of an unpatented product of a secret
formula, as distinguished from the formula itself. In finding that the
contract in question was intended to further monopoly and stifle free com-
petition, the court viewed it, not as a single contract, but as one of a system
of contracts of which it was the main, and not merely the ancillary pur-
pose, to consummate an unlimited restraint of trade.
Probably the most convincing authority in point, is the opinion of Mr.
Justice Lurton, in Park and Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (9o7),
r2 L. 1. A. (N. S.) 135.
RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS-PARTIAL RESTRAINT oF TRADE VOID AS TO PUBLIC SERVICE
CORPORATIONs.-In Central New York Telephone and Telegraph Co. v.
Averill, 92 N. E. Rep. 2o6 (N. Y. I910), the New York Court of Appeals
held that a contract by the terms of which the owner of a hotel agreed to
grant a telephone company the exclusive right to instal and operate tele-
phone service in the hotel for nine years, was void as against public
policy.
It is a perfectly well settled rule of law that contracts in general re-
straint of trade are void. It is equally well established that contracts in
partial restraint of trade may be held valid if they are based on valuable
considerations, and are reasonable. Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 744 (Eng.
1831) ; Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Pa. 467 (I866). The test of what is reasonable
in the terms of such contracts is, according to Tindal, C. J., in Horner v.
Graves, supra: "Whether the restraint is such as to afford a fair protection
to the interests of the party in favor of whom it is given, and not so
large as to interfere with the interests of the public."
By this criterion the contract in the principal case would certainly
seem valid; and it was so held by the decision of the Supreme Court of
New York, which the Court of Appeals reversed. See 129 N. Y. App.
Div. 752.
But there is a class of contracts in partial restraint of trade, which are
void under any and all circumstances. To this class belong all contracts in
restraint of trade to which a public service corporation is a party. So a
contract whereby an oil transportation company was given the exclusive
right to lay pipe lines over and under certain land, was declared invalid.
Transportation Co. v. Pipe Line Co., 22 W. Va. 60 (1883). And it has
been held unlawful for a railroad company to grant a telegraph company
the exclusive right of erecting lines along its right of way. Western Union
Co. v. American Union Co., 65 Ga. i6o (i88o); R. R. Co. v. Postal Tele-
graph Co., 173 Ill. 508 (i898). These cases proceed on the proposition
that inasmuch as the state has, by statute, given the public service corpora-
tions the right of eminent domain, it has declared its immediate interest in
every parcel of land within its borders; that since the state has granted
the public service companies the right to make use of any parcel of land
it chooses to take, it is not for any individual to declare that on some
particular parcel of land, the rights of all but one corporation serving the
public in a given way, shall be restricted.
That this reasoning applies in the present case is obvious in view of the
fact that the company concerned was organized under a franchise giving
it the power of eminent domain. Moreover, as the court observes, "A
contract between a telephone corporation and one of its subscribers whereby
the latter excludes all other telephone service from his premises, deprives all
the patrons of that other telephone service from telephonic communication
with such subscribers and all the occupants of his premises. Though the
number affected by one such exclusive contract may not be large, if ex-
clusion may be exacted from one customer, it may be exacted from all, and
so a corporation first in the field might establish a monopoly to the detri-
ment of the community, and their deprivation of telephonic intercommunica-
tion.'
CORPORATiONS-LIADILITy 1i01 AssEsSMZNT AS BETWEEN VENDOR AND
VENDEE oF STocK.-The plaintiff, in Rogers v. Tolan, 43 Pa. Superior Ct. 248
(i9IO), prior to June 5, I899 was the registered owner of one hundred
shares of stock in the American Alkaline Company, a corporation of the
state of New Jersey. On that day the plaintiff's brokers, sold these shares
to the defendants, also brokers, for cash, and turned over the certificates
transferred in blank by the plaintiff. On June 6, 1899, defendants sold to
another broker, turning over the certificates as they had received them. The
defendants at no time thereafter had any interest in the stock and what
subsequent transfers were made the record does not disclose. The stock
RECENT CASES
was never transferred on the books of the company, always- standing in the
name of the plaintiff. On the insolvency- of the corporation the receiver
recovered from the plaintiff an assessment levied on each share to assist in
the liquidation of the cbmpany's debts, and the plaintiff then brought an
action against his immediate transferree for the moily he was thus com-
pelled to pay, contending that there was an implied contract on the part
of purchaser of stock to indemnify the registered owner for any call or
assessment he was forced to pay, not only as long as this buyer retained
ownership and a right to immediate profits, but during the years after he
was parted with the stock and every right and interest incident to its
ownership. The Court held that no such agreement to indemnify can be
implied on the part of a purchaser of stock; the only remedy for the
registered owner who has been forced to pay an assessment being against
the ownier of the stock at the time such assessment is levied.
For this decision the Court had no Pennsylvania cases as a precedent
on the facts and very few in other jurisdictions, not determined under
statute. Kellock v. Beethoven, L. R. 92 B. 241 (i873) the leading English
case on the subject, makes a purchaser of stock, who in his turn has
sold, indemnify his vendor for assessments levied and collected from this
vendor, after the passage of the stock to third parties. Brinkler v. Hamilton,
67 Md. i69 (1887) the American authority, decides that this obligation
to indemnify is co-extensive with the ownership of the stock, and no liability
is imposed on unregistered transferees except that created by statute. Each
one of these cases was decided under a statute making every assignor and
assignee of shares of stock liable, under certain conditions, to the company
for calls and assessments. They both take the common law to be, that in
those cases where there has been an assignment of stock, but from neglect
or omission from any cause to have the actual transfer made on the books
of the company to the assignee, and the assignor remains the nominal ovwner
merely and because of that fact is required to pay calls on the stock, there is
an obligation on the part of the assignee to indemnify such nominal owner
of the shares, against calls made during the time the former remains
virtually lnd potentially the owner though not registered as such, citing
Walker v. Bartlett, 18 C. B. 845 and Johnson v. Underhill, 52 N. Y. 203.
These cases, howVever, did not declare so broad a doctrine. The defend-
ant in each case was both unregistered transferee and holder of the stock.
That a vendor may recover money he has had to pay on account of the
failure of his vendee to register the transfer seems uidoubted where the
vendee holds the stock when the call is made, Lichten v. Verner, 8 Pa.
Dist. Rep. 218. Such case falls directly under the fundamental principle
that "where a person has been compelled by legal process to pay, or being
so compellable has paid, money which another person was ultimately liable
to pay at law or in equity so that the latter has obtained the benefit of the
payment by the discharge of his liability, the person having so paid may
charge the person so discharged with a debt for the money paid for his
use." Leake Contracts, 5th Ed. 43. But the defendant in the principle
case was not ultimately liable to pay this assessment and had obtained
no benefit from the payment by the discharge of a liability. The ease
seems analogous to, and indeed the Court compares it with, cases of sale
and purchase of land subject to payment of mortgages, taxes or other in-
cumbrances where the principle has been declared and followed that,
although each succeeding tenant is liable for the discharge of rent, taxes,
etc., during his ownership, that liability is rooted in the fact of ovfnership
and ceases with it, Walker v. Plysick, 5 Pa. i93. Business expediency certainly
justifies the court in adopting this principle in the case of sale and purchase
of stock, following the dicta of Prinkley v. Hamilton.
EVIDENCE-UsE OF MEMORANDA BY WITNEsSEs.-Under a statute making
it a penal offense to unite in marriage a female under fifteen a conviction
was secured on the testimony of a witness who, relying upon a church
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record, but neither knowing the girl nor recalling her birth or christening,
testified that he christened her on such a date as would make her age under
fifteen. Upon appeal the Supreme Court granted a new trial on the technical
ground that the witness failed to aver that the record was correct. Territory
v. Hardwood, IIO Pac. Rep. 556 (New Mexico, igIo).
The general rule is, that a witness may use written memoranda to re-
fresh his memory (I) where the writing revives his memory and brings
to" his mind a recollection of the facts so that he can testify to them as of
his own recollection; (2) where, although it brings to him neither any
recollection of the facts mentioned in it nor any recollection of the writing
itself, it nevertheless enables him to swear to the facts because of the
correctness of the memoranda, in which cases the memoranda may be read.
Acklen's Ex. v. Hickhan, 6.3 Ala. 494. Costello v. Crowell, 133 Mass. 352.
Downer v. Romel, 24 Vt. 343. 1 Greenleaf Sec. 437; 1 Wigmore Sec. 747.
Our principal case falls under this second class which, although generally
adopted, differs in various jurisdictions as to the manner of proving the cor-
rectness of the memoranda. Some courts require that he must have known
it to be correct when made. Acklen's Ex. v. Hickman, supra; Davis v.
Field, 56 Vt. 428. "It is sufficient if he knew he could not have made the
entry unless the fact was true." Costello v. Crowell, supra. "It is not
necessary that he should be able to state that it was correctly made; it is
necessary only that its correctness is in some way verified:' Eder v. Reilly,
48. Minn. 437.
In Massachusetts, only regular entries, not mere casual memoranda can
be used, apparently on the ground that their regularity is the only satis-
factory guarantee of their correctness. Perkins v. Ins. Co., io Gray 323.
But this is an exception to the general rule.
A testimonial guarantee of accuracy being all that is required, it is gen-
erally immaterial whether the witness was or was not the person who
actually made the memorandum. Green v. Caulk, i6 Md. 573; Clark v. Bank,
164 N. Y. 498. The requirement that the memorandum shall be made by
the witness himself is usually a loose obiter dictum. Morrison v. Chapin,
97 Mass. 82; Howard v. McDonough, 77 N. Y. 592.
EviDENcE-SEcIFic AcTs OF PRIOR NEGLIGENcE.-The plaintiff, a motor-
man, was injured in a collision caused by the reckless and negligent opera-
tion of a special car under the control of a crew alleged to be incompetent.
Held. Evidence of specific acts of prior negligence on the part of such
crew tending to prove their incompetency was admissible when the master
had, or by the exercise of due care should have had, knowledge of such acts.
Robbins v. Lewiston, A. & W. St. Ry., 77 At. 537 (Me. I9io).
This case, the first to be decided in Maine upon the precise point, is
supported by the weight of authority' Where the liability of an employer
depends upon the incompetency of an employe such incompetency may be
proved by the general reputation of the employe; B. & 0. Ry. Co. v.
Henthorne, 73 Fed. 634 (1896); Cooney v. Commonwealth Av. St. Ry., i96
Mass. i3 (1907) ; Park v. R. R. Co., i55 N. Y. 215 (1898) ; or by evidence
of particular acts of prior misconduct on part of the employe. First Nat.
Bank v. Chandler, z44 Ala. 286 (ipo5); Banlec v. N. Y. & H. Ry. Co., 59
N. Y. 356 (1874); Southern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Hetzer, 135 Fed. 272 (io5);
contra, Frazier v. Pa. R. R., 38 Pa. 104 (i86o); Hatt v. Nay, I44 Mass.
I86 (1887).
The Massachusetts and Pennsylvania Courts which alone hold contra
to the doctrine of the principal case base their rule of exclusion upon the
doctrine of unfair surprise to the defendant whose liability is thus made
to depend on facts of which he has no prior notice and so cannot fairly
try and of multiplicity of issues tending to confuse the jury. Huntington,
etc., Ry. Co. v. Decker, 82 Pa. II9 (1876) modifying Frazier v. R. R., supra;
Connors v. Norton, i6o Mass. 333 (894).
It is submitted that evidence of particular acts of prior negligence has a
logically probative force upon the issue of incompetency which outweighs
any reasons of policy given for its exclusion. The master whose liability
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now depends upon his failure to discharge an incompetent employe would
not discharge a servant merely because he had gained a general reputation
for incompetency. He would require information of particular acts of
misconduct. It follows that the jury should be permitted to judge of the
incompetency of the servant from the same facts on which the master
ought to have acted. Metropolitan, etc., Ry. v. Fortin, 203 Ill. 454 (903);
Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Ry. Co. v. Ruby, 38 Ind. 294 (1871).
The general reputation of a servant for incompetency is of value in
proving the master's knowledge thereof. When the employe's acts of mis-
conduct are so gross as to be generally known throughout the community,
the master necessarily knew or should have known of them. O'Donnell v.
American Sugar Refining Co., 58 N. Y. S. 64o (x899); Gulf C. & S. F. Ry.
v. Hays, 89 S. W. 29 (Tex. i9O5).
HUSBAND AND WiFE-AcTION BY WIFE FOR ALIENATION OF HUSBAND'S
AFFEcTIoN.-In an action by one married woman, living apart from her hus-
band, against another, similarly'situated, for enticing away plaintiff's husband
and alienating his affections, neither husband being joined in the suit, it
was decided that plaintiff could recover under certain statutes for the benefit
of married women, upon which she based her case. Eliason v. Draper, 77
Atl. Rep. 572 (Del. i9IO).
The first statute, enacted in 1871 and amended in 1893, provides that
a "married woman living separate from, and not supported by, her husband,
. . . may sue in her own name, and for her own use, for . . . the redress
of her personal wrongs, torts, or private injuries." The second, enacted
in 1873, provides "That any married woman may prosecute and defend suits
at law or in equity for the preservation or protection of her property, as
if unmarried. . . ." The court, after stating that plaintiff could have
recovered under the Act of 187r, having placed herself in the position
therein contemplated, go on to say that she could also have recovered under
the Act of 1873 by itself, as it had been interpreted in a previous case in
that state. Hatton v. Wilmington City Railway Company, 3 Pennewill, i59,
5o Atl. 663 (i9OI), which decided that the wife's right to the consortium
of her husband was a property right. Their view is that such remedial
legislation removes from a wife, in the positions contemplated, those disa-
bilities imposed on her by coverture, and that she is thus free to maintain
an action for the preservation of a right which has always been hers.
Woolley, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, divides the cases on
this subject into four classes; but it has seemed best to consider them as only
forming three groups, inasmuch as all but one of the cases cited in the
second class belong to the third or fourth: (I) those holding that under
such remedial statutes the wife is permitted to sue alone only where she
could have sued before with her husband-on the theory that the non-
existence of a remedy indicates the absence of the right-in which class
there are now only two states, Maine and Wisconsin, New Jersey having
recently reversed its previous attitude and joined the second class in this
present classification. Libby v. Berry, 74 Me. 286 (1883), 43 Amer. Rep.
58, and Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374 (189O), 45 N. W. 522; (2) those
holding that the wife can sue in a case like the present under such statutes
as the first one above cited--on the broader ground of having had the right
without the remedy, which the statutes supply, Bennett v. Bennett, 1i6 N.
Y. 584 (1889), 23 N. E. 17; Nolin v. Pearson, I91 Mass. 283 (i9o6), 77
N. E. 89o; Sims v. Sims, 76 Atl. io63 (N. J. igio), and Gernerd v. Gernerd,
185 Pa. 233 (1898) ; (3) those holding that the wife's right to the consortium of
her husband is a property right, which may be protected under such statutes as
the second one above cited-on the narrower ground of the right to the hus-
band's consortium being a property right, Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio
St. 621 (1878) 32 Am. Rep. 397; Warren v. Warren, 89 Mich. 123 (1890,
50 N. W. 842. The one jurisdiction which holds that the wife has had the
right of action all along, regardless of enabling 'statutes, is Connecticut.
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Foot v. Card, 58 Conn., i (i889), i8 Atl. io27, and is clearly an anomaly
in the law. The second class, as given above, rests on the true foundation.
and comprises a majority of the states, though there are quite a number in the
third. It is difficult to place the present case, because, under the statute
of 187r, it belongs in the second group above, while under that of 1873 it
belongs in the third. However, it would be on a stronger basis, if classed
with the second group.
MASTER AND SERvANT-REcOvERY FOR N_.vous SHOCK UNDER WORKMEN'S
COmPENsATION AcT.-In Yates v. South Kirby, etc., Colleries, Ltd., L. R. 2
K. B. 538, July 5, igio, the plaintiff, a collier, claimed damages for injuries
received, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, ,9o6, 6 Edw. VII, C. 58,
Sec. i. While at work, the plaintiff heard a shout for help, and, upon search,
discovered a fellow-collier who had been knocked dovtn by a fallen timber
prop and some coal. The plaintiff, having assisted in the carrying away of
the injured man, who died shortly afterward, received such a nervous shock
that he was incapacitated from work, although he made distinct efforts to
resume his duties on various occasions. Held: "Nervous shock, due to
accident, which causes personal incapacity to work, is as much personal injury
by accident as a broken leg," etc.The case is interesting, in that the sole issue presented is the proximity
of the physical injury resulting from the nervous shock, there being no
question of the employer's negligence or violation of duty under the Work-
men's Compensation Act, supra. The violation.of a duty having been estab-
lished, whether or not nervous shock resulting from such violation is the
proximate result is a much mooted question. This question was considered
in Victorian Rwy. Comm. v. Soulas, 13 L. R. App. Cas. 222, 1888, and the
damage was held as too remote. Since that time the English courts have been
inclined to reject the doctrine there laid down, and have allowed recovery.
In Julien v. White, 7o L. J. R. K. B. 837, igoi, it was held: "If the fear is
proved to have naturally and directly produced physical effects, so that the
ill results of the negligence which caused the fear are as measurable in
damages as the same results would be if they arose from an actual impact,
why should not an action for those damages lie just as well as it lies where
there has been that actual impact?" "Once get the duty and the physical
damage following on the breach of duty, and I hold that the fact of one link
in the chain of causation being mental makes no difference." See also Bell
v. Gt. Northern Rwy., 26 Ir. L. R. 428, i889; Braddon v. Caledonian Rwy.,
4 Fraser, 88o, iqO2; Pugh v. London, etc., Rwy. 1896, L. R. 2, Q. B. 248.
The question is most frequently raised in cases of negligence by a com-
mon carrier in the transportation of a passenger, where recovery is generally
allowed. Fitzpatrick v. Gt. Western Rwy., 12 U. C. Q. B. 645 (i855); G. C.
& S. T. R R. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239 (igoo); Stewart v. Ark. R. R., 112 La.
763 (19o4) ; Simone v. R. I. Co., 28 R. I. i86 (i9o7) ; Oliliger v. Toledo Trac.
Co., 23 Ohio Circ. 265 ( ? ). In Sloane v. S. Cal. Rwy., iii Cal. 668.
(i896), the distinction between nervous shock and mere fright is carefully
drawn, concluding, * * * "If these nerves, or the entire nervous system
is thus affected, there is a physical injury thereby produced, and, if the primal
cause of this injury is tortious, it is immaterial whether it is direct, as by a
blow, or indirect, through some action upon the mind." The person injured
must not be one of peculiar sensitiveness. Spade v. L. & B. R. R., i68 Mass.
285 (x897). For cases where the negligence is by a person or body other
than a common carrier in the transportation of a passenger, see Hickey v.
Welsh, 9i Mo. App. 4 (I9O1); Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co., 131 N. C. 536
(igoi); Oliver v. La Valle, 36 Wis. 592 (1875); Chic. & N. W. Rwy. v.
Hunerberg, i6 Ill. App. 387 (1885) ; Armour v. Kollmeyer, I6I Fed. 78 (i9o8).
Many courts, however, refuse to depart from the doctrine of Victorian
Rwy. Comm. v. Soulas, supra, and require proof of ihysical impact before
a verdict for resultant nervous shock will be supported. Mitchell v. Rochester
Rwy., I5i N. Y. i07 (i86); Mack v. South Bound R. R., 52 S. C. 323 (1897).
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The rule in Pennsylvania is clearly established that the injury in such cases
is too remote. Ewing v. Pitts., Chic. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 41 (1892); Chit-
lick v. P. R. T. Co., 224 Pa. i3 (Io9) ; Morris v. L. & Wyo. Val. L R., 228
Pa. 198 (igo).
The extension of liability to cases of nervous shock corresponds to the
economic necessities of the times, and, in view of the fact that those courts
which have adopted the rule have limited the operation of it within a reason-
able compass, it would seem that such adoption is wise and expedient.
NEGLIGENCE-SUBSEQUENT NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S AGENT.-The case
of Grant v. Owners of S. S. Egyptian (igio) Appeal Cases, 400, is interest-
ing mainly on its facts. A watchman employed by the plaintiffs to take
charge of their trawler in dock, agreed with the defendants' manager to
take the defendants' trawler into the same dock. By pure negligence the
watchman so navigated the defendants' trawler as to cause a collision with*
the plantiffs' trawler. The injury was slight in itself and reasonable care
would have prevented further harm, but the watchman, on returning to the
plaintiffs' ship entirely neglected his duty to examine the injury and use
reasonable care in the prevention of further harm, and in consequence the
plaintiffs' trawler sank. Held: The defendants were liable for the damage,
which was the natural and direct consequence of their wrongful act, i. e., the
injury due directly to the collision, but were not liable for any further
damage which could have been avoided or minimized by the exercise of
reasonable care on the part of the plaintiffs, that is, the sinking of the
vessel.
As a proposition of the law of tort the decision is sound. The doctrine
that the plaintiffs' negligence subsequent to the accident may operate as an
intervening cause exempting the defendant from liability for resulting
damage due to that negligence is generally accepted, and the plaintiff,
under such circumstances, "is bound to use reasonable skill and diligence to
save his property from suffering further injury." Chase v. N. Y. Central,
24 Barb. 274 (857); 13 Cyc. 75, N. 54. The English courts have applied
the doctrine to admiralty cases. So in the case of H. M. S. Flying Fish, 2.
.Moore P. C. (N. S.) 77, where there was a collision between two vessels
due to negligence of the defendant's crew, the defendant was held liable
for the injury caused by the collision, but not for the total loss of the ship,
due to the subsequent negligence of plaintiff's crew.
The facts of the case give a very. interesting example of the. law of
agency. The servant whose negligence makes the defendants liable for
one injury, and the servant whose negligence bars the plaintiffs' recovery for
the other injury, is one and the same man. If, however, we apply the test
used in Laugher v. Pointer, 2 B. & C. Rep. 547; Jones v. Scullard, L. R. 2, Q. B.
Div. 565, and following cases, we must agree that the House of Lords was
right in holding the watchman the servant of the defendants while navigating
their vessel into the dock, and the servant of the plaintiffs as soon as he
returned to their vessel as watchman
NUISANCE-LEGISLATIVE AUTHOmTY.-In Adler v. Pruitt, 53 So. 315, Ala.,
July 6, igio, the legislature had created a commission, with authority to
construct a sewer. Upon its completion, this proved to be a nuisance to the
plaintiff, a neighboring landowner, who recovered from the individual to
whom the system- had been leased, Sayer, J., holding: "In the absence of
express statutory provision to that effect, it cannot be assumed that it was
intended to legalize an act which would necessarily result in a nuisance."
The reason for the decision is tb be found in the constitutional principle
involved.
The leading case is in accord with the American rule of legislative
authority as to the erection of a nuisance. Sadlier v. N. Y., 4o N. Y. Misc.
79 (,93); Gaynor, J.: "The full extent of legislative power to legalize and
shield a nuisance is to exempt it from public prosecution." "The more plain
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and explicit the legislature might be in authorizing the taking of private
property or a direct injury thereto by a nuisance per se * * * the more
plain it would make manifest that it had exceeded its constitutional powers."
The principal stated seems to have been recognized from the time of
the establishment of our government. Nichols v. Pixly, I Root, (Conn.)
129, (1789). "The license, however it may estop the town from proceed-
ing against the dam as a common nuisance, it can be no excuse or
justification for an injury done to private property." See also Eastman v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 44 N. H. 143 (1862), accord on analogous facts; Blane
v. Murray, 36 La. 162 (1884). "The legislature of a State * * * cannot
authorize a use (of property) that will create a private nuisance;". Churchill
v. Burlington Water Co., 94 IA. 89 (895): "Nor can we presume from a
mere grant of power to erect, maintain and operate water works, that either
the legislature or city councils intended to legalize the erection and main-
tenance of a nuisance;" Townsend v. Norfolk Rwy. & Light Co., io5 Va.
22 (x9o6): "Immunity is not to be presumed from a general grant of
authority."
In England a somewhat different rule would seem to prevail. British
Cast Plate Mfrs. v. Meredith, 4 T. L 794 (1792); Sutton v. Clarke, 6
Taunt 29 (I815) ; Bidulph v. Vestry of Parish of St. George, 3 De G. J. & S.
492 (1863). As stated in Sadlier v. N. Y., supra, the reason for the conflict
of authority is that in England, Parliament is under no limitation or restraint,
and the question becomes merely an interpretation of the intention of the
legislators. Plowden, 467. Wherever possible, the English courts will con-
strue the statute narrowly. Atty. Gen. v. Asylum, 38 L. J. Ch. 265 (1869);
Vernon v. Vestry of St. James, 5o L. J. Ch. 81 (i88o) ; Sellors v. Board of
Health, 14 Q. B. D. 928 (1885), and the result attained is practically the
-ame in both countries. Where, however, Parliament sees fit to legalize a
nuisance in express terms, there is no remedy for the individual injured,
while in this country, such exercise of authority is unconstitutional, and the
statute legalizing the nuisance merely nugatory.
Some of the English cases, apparently following the American rule, may
be distinguished. In Price Patent Candle Co. v. London County Council,
78 L. J. Ch. (i9o9), the statute under which the defendants were acting
expressly forbade the creation of a nuisance. In Lea Conservancy Board v.
Mayor of Hertford, I Cab. & El. 299 (1884), there was no real injury, and
in Harrison v. S. & V. Water Co., 2 L. R. Ch. (i8gi) 409, and National
Telephone Co. v. Baker, 2 L. R. Ch. 93 (1893), the user was held reasonable.
There remain to be considered the cases in which railroads in a reasonable
user have caused injury to neighboring proprietors. In these cases the
English and American courts seem to be at one in holding that there is no
liability on the principle Salus populi suprema lex, Bac. Max. reg. 12; King
v. Pease, 4 B. & Ad. 30 (1832); Vaughan v. Taff Vale Rwy. Co., 5 Hurlst
& Non, 678 (i86o); Hammersmith, etc., Rwy. Co. v. Brand, 4 L. R. E. & I.
App. 171 (i869); Taylor v. Seaboard & Aair Line Rwy., 59 S. L. 129, U. C.
(zgo7), and Balto. & Potomac R. R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, io8 U. S. 317,
per Field, J.: "If a railway, authorized by Congress, when used with reason-
able care produces only that incidental inconvenience which unavoidably fol-
lows the additional occupation of the streets by its cars, with the noises and
disturbances necessarily attending their use, no one can complain that he is
incommoded. Whatever consequential annoyance may necessarily follow from
the running of cars on the road with reasonable care is damnum absque
injuria. The private inconvenience * * * must be for the public accom-
modation." This principle is followed' in Pennsylvania, P. R. R. v. Marchant,
ii9 Pa. 541 (i888); Wunderlich v. P. R.- R. 223 Pa. 114 (igo9), unless, of
course, the injury is done in the construction of the work. P. R. R. v. Dun-
can, iTT Pa. 352 (1886) ; Pa., L. V. R. Co. v. Walsh, 124 Pa. 544 (i889).
Unless expressly authorized by Parliament, it would seem that the erection
or creation of any work but railroads under legislative authority, resulting in
a nuisance to a neighboring landowner, is actionable.
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EPEmN-DUTY OF DEFENDANT TO AccEPT TENDER OF PART OF GOODS.-
The case of Leeper, Graves & Co. v. First Nat. Bank, io Pac. 655 (Okla.
x19o), presents the question of the extent of the duty of the successful
defendant in a replevin suit to accept a partial tender of the goods and
recoup on the bond given by the plaintiff. In this case the bank was a
pledgee in possession of eight steel bridges which were replevied by the
plaintiffs and bond executed. Upon judgment for the defendant and tender
made, it appeared that certain essential parts of the bridges were missing.
The defendant refused to accept, and claimed full indemnity on the bond.
A judgment below to this effect was reversed, the higher court holding that it
was the duty of defendant to accept tender and recoup on the bond.
Upon this question there appears to be some conflict of opinion, in spite
of the fact that it has not come before the courts as often as might be
expected. The trend of authority is strongly in favor of our principal case,
and the cases in conflict seem to be ignored as of no importance. Cobbey on
Replevin, 2nd Ed., § 1389. It would seem worth while, however, to mention
Whetmore v. Rupe, 65 Cal. 237 (1884), and Pauls v. Mundine, 37 Tex. App.
6o (i9o5), as presenting the best authority for the opposite point of view.
There is a lower court case in New York to the same effect, Kingsley v.
Sauer, 4! N. Y. 5. 248 (r896), and the rule was recognized, though not
applied in Stevens v. Tuite, IO4 Mass. 328 (I87O). The cases mentioned
proceed upon the ground of a strict interpretation of the judgment obtained,
and regard the alternatives of indemnity or return of the specific goods aswhole and indivisible rights. The mass of authority allowing a return ofgoods in part, imposes certain definite restrictions upon the application of the
rule. For example, it can only apply where the goods returned are separablefrom the others, so as not to be dependent upon them for use and value,
Edwin v. Cox, 6i Ill. App. 567 (x895), and do not constitute a whole and
entire claim, Stevens v. Tuite, supra. Some courts assert that the propertywhen returned must be in as good condition as when taken, Harts v. Wendell.
26 II. App. 274 (1887), but others allow the diminution in value to be
recovered by a suit on the bond. Yelton v. Sinclair, 8o fd. Igo (1882). The
latter view seems correct here for all the reasoning that can apply to apartial return of the goods applies to a return of goods partially damaged.
In the case under discussion it was said that the missing parts of the bridge
were such as could easily be procured in the market, so that the structures
could, without hardship, be put in their original condition. In spite of the
various limitations imposed by different courts, the main reason for all the
decisions is a simple, yet fundamental one. In the action of replevin it is
primarily the specific property that is sought, and the original theory of
alternative damages was to cover cases where, for some reason, the identical
property could not be returned. "At the termination of the suit, it is not
optional with him, the successful party, to take the property or its value.
If the other has the property and will permit him to take it, he is obliged todo so." Allen v. Fox, 5I N. Y. 562 (1873). In short, in replevin it is the
status ante quo that is sought to be established. When, therefore, part of the
property can be returned without working injustice, it is but fair to make
the party take back his own goods-the very object he had in mind in bring-
ing the suit.
A comparison with the action of travcr shows that ancient technicalities
are being disregarded, and that the growing tendency is to allow a return of
the goods in mitigation of damages. Such has been the law of England
since i762, when it was laid down by Lord Mansfield, C. 3., by way of dicta
in the case of Fisher v. Prince, 3 Burr, f364. His reasons are concise and
convincing. "It ought to be done to prevent vexiatiou ltigation, which a
plaintiff may be tempted to pursue when, in ale he is sure of costs.
It ought to be done, because it is the specific relief. An estimated value is a
precarious measure of justice, compared with the specific thing." In accord,
see Earle v. Holderners, 4 Bing. 462 (1833). In this country the English rule
has been recognize d applied. Churchill v. Welsh, 47 Wis. 39 (i879);
t. pr. v. Bank of Middlebury, 32 Vt. 639 (86); Ward v. Moffett, 38 M.
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App. 395 (889). For other jurisdictions, where the rule has been recog-
nized, if not applied, see cases cited, Sutherland on Damages, 3d Ed., Vol. 3,
§ 114o. These cases are in- direct conflict with the general law that an offer
to return only operates in mitigation when accepted. It must be noted,
however, that the above doctrine has only been applied to cases free from
complications, where the conversion is really technical, where special dam-
ages are not claimed and the value of the goods does not fluctuate. It would
seem, therefore, that the tendency in both replevin and trover is to make the
complainant receive back his goods where just and possible, and upon this
theory the case under discussion seems in line with modern development.
STATUTES-INQUIRY INTO VALIDITY OF ENROLLED AcTs.-In the recent case
of Rash v. Allen, 76 Atl. 370, (Igio), the Superior Court of Delaware held an
act void which had been signed by the presiding officers of both houses of
the legislature, passed by the Governor, and duly enrolled, because the names
of the members voting for and against the measure did not appear on the
journals, as required by the constitution.
The question how far courts shall treat an enrolled bill as conclusive of
the existence of the law, including the regularity and validity of its passage
through all necessary stages, is one of some difficulty, and on which American
jurisdictions are irreconcilably divided. In i45o, in Pylkington's Case, Y. B.
33 Hen. 6. f. 17, pl. 8, the court referred the matter to the next Parliament;
but the later cases, Rex v. Blundell, Hob. iio (i51g), and Ry. Co. v.
Wauchope, 8 Ch. & Fin. 710 (1842), and English text-writers state that with
irregularities or departures from the usage of Parliament the courts have
nothing to do. Hardcastle on Statutory Law', p. 40. In America the well
* recognized doctrine that courts will declare an unconstitutional act void, and
the requirements of the constitutions as to the manner of enacting laws have
caused a conflict of authority. Where a court declares a statute void as not
having been passed in accordance with constitutional requirements, it must
go back of the enrolled act, to discover the manner of its enactment. Many
jurisdictions hold the courts have a right to look at something besides the
enrolled act, adopting the "journal entry doctrine." The leading case and the
basis for this line of decision is Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297 (1853). The
reasons given are principally tyro: I. Since the courts have power to decide
whether or not a law constitutionally passed is valid, they have power to
decide that an act was not constitutionally passed; and the journals of the
legislative body are the best evidence on this subject; 2. The sovereign
power-the people-can by their organic law impose limitations upon legis-
lative power in the passage of an act, and these provisions, being mandatory,
should be enforced by the courts. These courts have assumed that to
determine whether constitutional rules of legislative procedure have been
complied with is a judicial question. Other jurisdictions have adopted the
English "enrolled act doctrine" on the grounds of: I. Public policy, which
demands that vested interests shall not be endangered by allowing old stat-
utes to be overthrown upon a discovery that the clerk was careless, Panghorn
v. Young, 32 N. J. L. 29 (1866) ; 2. The unreliability of legislative journals.
Weeks v. Smith, 81 Me. 538 (i889). The unsatisfactory nature of this evi-
dence is frequently pointed out, not only by the courts which refuse to resort
to it, but also by the courts which do. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1891).
In many instances decisions from the same State appear on both sides of the
question. Carr v. Coke, ii6 N. C. 223 (1895) ; Bank v. Commissioners, 1i9
N. C. 214 (1896) ; St. v. Hagood, i3 S. C. 46 (i88o), directly overruled by St.
v. Chester, 39 S. C. 307 (1893) ; and some jurisdictions have changed their
rule several times, St. v. McBride, 4 Mo. 303 (1836) ; R. R. v. Governor, 23
Mo. 353 (1856) ; St. v. Mead, 71 Mo. 266 (1879). In several cases where the
courts. felt constrained to follow their former rulings, holding the journals
competent, regret is expressed that a different rule had not prevailed, St. v.
Moore, 37 Neb. 13 (1893). Others express a doubt whether the journal is
the better rule. People v. Starne, 35 Ill. 121 (1864).
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It is submitted that this is largely a question of governmental policy-
someone must be trusted. Since the vital function of the legislature is to
enact laws, it is wholly inconsistent with the fundamental principle that the
departments of government are equal and independent in their respective
spheres, that the judiciary should be supervisors of the legislature's per-
formance of its peculiar duty. The current of judicial decision in the last
fifteen years has been strongly against the right of the court to go back of
the enrolled act, Sutherland Statutory Construction, 2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 72; so
the decision in the principal case is against the weight of recent opinion.
TORTs-LDAn.ITy op MUNIciPAL OncEs.-In the case of Wallenberg
v. City of Minneapolis, 127 N. W. 422 (Minn. 19o), a property owner brought
suit against the city to recover damages for injury to his property caused
by lowering the grade of the street on which it bordered. The city engineer,
.his assistant, and the street commissioner were joined with the municipality
as defendants. It appeared that while it was within the authority of the
governing body of the city to fix the grade of the streets, in the present
instance the necessary forms had not been complied with. It was a case of
a public improvement made by a municipality, but in an irregular and unau-
thorized manner. A Minnesota statute provides that: "Private property shall
not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just compensa-
tion therefor first paid or secured.", The verdict in the trial court was for the
defendants. The Supreme Court, after showing the undoubted liability of
the municipality, ordered a new trial as to it, but refused to disturb the
verdict in favor of the personal defendants joined. Held: "Such officers
and employers should not be required to determine at their own risk the
legality of the proceedings pursuant io which they performed the acts com-
plained of."
It seems exceedingly doubtful that the case is good law. The general
rule is that if the agent's acts are a tort he is liable regardless of his author-
ity from his principal or his principal's liability. In the case of certain
public officers, however, there is an exception. Purely ministerial officers,
acting under authority from judicial or quasi-judicial bodies, are protected, if
their authority appears on its face regular and the subject matter is within
the jurisdiction of the body in question. Thus a constable is not liable in
trespass for seizing chattels under a writ of replevin which appears on its
face to have been issued from competent authority and with legal regularity.
Watson v. Watson, 9 Conn. 140 (1832). In the same way an officer is pro-
tected in making an arrest on a writ which appears on its face valid. Under-
wood v. Robinson, xo6 Mass. 296 (187). So a warrant issued by a receiver
of taxes, or board having in charge the levy of the tax in question, when
apparently regular, protects the officer acting under it. Cunningham v.
Mitchell, 67 Pa. St. 78 (i87o).
These exceptions seem to be founded on public expediency. The col-
lection of taxes and the administration of justice are vital to the existence
of any government, and the ministerial officer should not be deterred by fear
of a personal liability he cannot guard against. But it is carrying this prin-
ciple beyond a point where it can soundly apply, when it is made to include
cases of municipal public service not vital to the existence of government.
It would be going little further to hold that the executor of any work public
in its nature is exempt from personal liability by an authority apparently
regular, whether granted by the municipality or by the contractor to whom
work of that class has been let. It would seem sounder policy to confine
these exceptions strictly to the administration of governmental acts. Where
'cases have arisen on all fours with the principal case, the officers making the
excavation have been held liable in trespass. Lamed v. Briscoe, 62 Mich. 393
(i886) ; Bliss v. Sears, 24 Pa. rii (1854).
